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ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates the role of inflation-forecast heterogeneity in US monetary policy 
making. The deviation between private and central bank inflation forecasts is identified 
as a factor increasing inflation persistence and thus calling for a policy reaction. An 
optimal policy rule is derived by the minimization under discretion of a standard central 
bank loss function subject to a Phillips curve, modified to include the forecast deviation, 
and a forward-looking aggregate demand equation. This rule, which itself includes the 
forecast deviation as an additional argument, is estimated for the period 1974-1998, 
covering the Chairmanships of Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, by using 
real-time forecasts of inflation and the output gap obtained from the FOMC’s Greenbook 
and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The estimated rule remains remarkably stable 
over the whole sample period, challenging the conventional view of a structural break 
following Volcker’s appointment as Chairman of the Fed. Finally, the substantial  decline 
in the significance of the interest-rate smoothing term in the rule indicates that monetary 
policy inertia may, to a large extent, be an artifact of serially correlated inflation-forecast 
errors that feed into policy decisions in real time. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that central banks face substantial uncertainty regarding 
the impact of monetary policy decisions on the economy in general and on price 
developments in particular. This uncertainty is enhanced by the presence of long and 
often variable time lags in the transmission of monetary impulses to prices and has 
prompted the design of forward-looking monetary policy strategies. In the context of 
these strategies, the monetary authorities look at a wide range of economic and financial 
indicators in order to form a broadly-based assessment of the expected path of the 
relevant target variables (i.e. inflation and output).  
Within this range of indicators, private sector inflation expectations, as reflected 
in survey data or in financial-market prices are a key piece of information because they 
can signal future inflationary risks or at least provide some indications about how 
economic agents gauge these risks (Bernanke, 2004). The usefulness of the information 
conveyed by private expectations for the conduct of monetary policy critically depends 
on the degree of uncertainty characterizing monetary policy decision-making. Under the 
assumption of rational expectations and perfect information about the economy, agents’ 
expectations (i.e. the private sector’s and the central bank’s) as reflected in their 
respective forecasts should be identical. In this case, the central bank has only to look at 
its internal forecasts when making policy decisions. Nevertheless, experience suggests 
that private inflation expectations often become unmoored from central bank forecasts, 
and thus, they may represent a distinct source of information for policymakers. 
Information asymmetries about the nature of the shocks hitting the economy or about the 
model of the economy, the monetary transmission mechanism and the policy targets 
appear to be the main source of inflation-forecast heterogeneity. 
Private inflation forecasts provide not only a useful information variable in 
monetary policy analysis but also a potential intermediate target for the conduct of 
monetary policy. In particular, the achievement of a closer alignment of private forecasts 
with those of the central bank can, under certain conditions, prove a key component of an 
effective forward-looking monetary policy strategy. Thus, if agents in the private sector 
feel sure that inflation will remain well-controlled, they will be more restrained in their   6
wage-setting and pricing behavior, making it easier for the Federal Reserve to pursue its 
inflation target. Moreover, by reducing the risk that inflation will come loose from its 
moorings, the central bank has more short-term flexibility to react to disturbances that 
affect output and employment (Bernanke, 2004). Changes in monetary policy strategy, so 
as to take into account private expectations, as well as the effective communication of 
policy decisions and their rationale to the public, appear to be the main mechanisms for 
achieving better alignment between private and central bank forecasts. 
In general discussions about monetary policy, the question is often asked whether 
the central bank should focus on observable economic fundamentals and its internal 
procedures to forecast the future path of policy targets or pay some attention to “reliable 
outside forecasts” reflecting private expectations (Hall, 1984; Evans and Honkapohja, 
2003a). Nevertheless, in the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy 
implementation and transmission, the issue of inflation-forecast heterogeneity has not 
been properly addressed, with the exception of the literature on optimal filtering of 
inflation expectations (see among others, Lippi and Neri, 2003).  
In the present paper, the role of inflation-forecast heterogeneity in the conduct of 
monetary policy is analyzed. Specifically, an historical account of the Fed’s monetary 
policy making during the past thirty years is provided and the importance in the Fed’s 
reaction function of the deviation between the Fed’s and private inflation forecasts is 
evaluated. This deviation is identified as a major determinant behind the inflation 
persistence observed as it leads to a slowdown in the pace at which supply shocks 
(represented by the error term of a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve) die out. Thus, 
the Phillips curve is modified by including an additional term which corresponds to the 
autoregressive behavior of the forecast deviation and enables the decomposition of the 
autoregressive component of the supply shock into a part related to the forecast deviation 
and a remaining part reflecting structural supply factors. 
An optimal monetary policy rule is obtained by the minimization under discretion 
of a standard central bank loss function subject to the constraints provided by the 
modified Phillips curve, including the forecast deviation, and a standard forward-looking 
aggregate demand equation. The policy rule itself includes the forecast deviation as an   7
additional argument. According to this modified rule, when the private sector inflation 
forecast is higher than the central bank forecast, the monetary authorities will react by 
increasing the interest rate and vice versa. Hence, this deviation, by increasing inflation 
persistence, leads to monetary policy adjustments additional to those justified by 
developments in the official forecasts of the relevant target variables. Indeed, the 
monetary policy reaction to the forecast deviation appears to have been an important 
factor underlying the successful disinflation of the 1980s in the US as well as the 
persistence of inflationary pressures during the 1970s. 
The rule is estimated on a sample covering the period 1974-1998 corresponding to 
the Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan Chairmanships on the basis of real-
time inflation forecasts obtained from the FOMC’s Greenbook and the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, with the latter being used as a proxy of private inflation 
expectations. The results demonstrate that a simple policy rule in which the federal funds 
rate reacts to the inflation-forecast deviation performs very satisfactorily in describing the 
behavior of the FOMC as well as in accounting for the anti-inflationary record of the Fed 
since the early 1980s. In particular, the FOMC appears to have tightened whenever the 
private inflation forecast was higher than the Fed’s forecast, and to have eased when it 
was lower.  
A novel explanation is put forth for the pre-1980 high-inflation period which is 
attributed not to activist policies aiming at output gap stabilization, as is usually argued, 
but to the policy reaction in a period in which private inflation forecasts were lower than 
the respective central bank forecasts. Similarly, the success of Volcker’s disinflation can 
be attributed to the reaction to this deviation in a period when private inflation forecasts 
were significantly higher than central bank forecasts. Finally, following Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1998) among others, we introduce an interest-rate smoothing term into the 
policy rule and investigate its interaction with the forecast-deviation term. We find that 
including the forecast-deviation term significantly reduces the role of monetary policy 
inertia characterizing standard rule specifications. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework under which heterogeneity between private sector and central bank inflation   8
forecasts can be considered as relevant for describing actual monetary policy decision-
making. Section 3 derives our preferred policy rule specification. Section 4 provides 
estimates of the policy rule specification outlined in the previous section and compares 
them with conventional rule specifications and, finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Private inflation expectations and monetary policy 
2.1 Inflation-forecast heterogeneity and monetary policy making 
In actual policy making, central banks regularly monitor and analyze information 
regarding inflation expectations, as reflected in surveys or in financial-market prices 
(Brissimis and Magginas, 2005). Moreover, “forecasts of inflation are at the center of 
policy deliberations at inflation-targeting central banks and have arguably been equally 
important for policy decisions in non-inflation-targeting central banks such as the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank” (Orphanides and Williams, 2005). A recent 
example of such views is the following comment by the Federal Reserve’s Chairman 
Alan Greenspan who said in May 2001: “We have often pointed before to the essential 
role that low inflation expectations play in containing price pressures and promoting 
growth. Any evident tendency in financial markets or in household and business attitudes 
for such expectations to trend higher would need to factor importantly into our policy 
decisions” (Greenspan, 2001).   
Central bank leverage on the economy depends to a large extent on inflation 
expectations. Given that the Fed directly controls only one very short-term interest rate, 
the federal funds rate, its ability to affect longer-term yields and asset prices is 
conditional on private sector expectations about future monetary policy and, thus, on the 
path of the main policy target variables.  
Nevertheless, experience suggests that private expectations often become 
disconnected from official forecasts, especially at the outset of significant supply-side 
shocks. In such cases, even guidance from a transparent central bank cannot ensure the 
alignment of private expectations with the official central bank forecasts. The problem is 
even more serious in the case of central banks, such as the Fed, that publish their   9
forecasts on which monetary policy decisions are based only after a considerable delay. 
Episodes when expectations appeared to have become unmoored from the policymakers' 
objectives can be easily identified in the monetary history of the United States. The hikes 
in private inflation expectations during the first and second oil crises as well as during the 
first years of the Volcker Chairmanship provide examples of serious delinking of central 
bank forecasts from private expectations. This fact is reflected in the words of Chairman 
Volcker who noted in December 1980: “With all its built-in momentum and self-
sustaining expectations, [the inflationary process] has come to have a life of its own”. 
Fears of inflation or deflation, whether entirely justified from the policymakers' 
perspective or not, seemed to have influenced actual decision-making and economic 
behavior at times, presenting real complications for policy decisions (Orphanides and 
Williams, 2005).  
The ability of the central bank to steer private inflation expectations toward its 
internal forecasts and policy targets appears to be a key component of a successful 
monetary policy strategy. The adoption of a more anti-inflationary policy stance, 
compared to what would have been dictated by internal forecasts only, may be a 
prerequisite for bringing private forecasts closer to central bank forecasts. This alignment 
is achieved mainly through expectational effects about the future path of the monetary 
policy instrument. The cost of this alignment, in terms of output and policy instrument 
volatility, appears to be negatively related to the degree of monetary authorities’ 
credibility. For this reason, modern central banks are becoming increasingly transparent 
about their objectives and their policy strategy, conveying more information to the 
private sector with a view to increasing their credibility and accountability as well as the 
private sector’s understanding of the major factors underlying monetary policy decisions. 
It is of significant interest to assess whether the monetary authorities take into account 
forecast deviations in their decision-making process, adjusting their policy strategy in 
relation to the size of these deviations.   
 
 
   10
2.2 Rational expectations and forecast heterogeneity 
Even though in actual policy making central banks pay close attention to the 
private sector’s inflation expectations, in standard models inflation expectations of the 
private sector are of little independent interest to policymakers (Orphanides and 
Williams, 2005). Private expectations do not appear to have any role in most of the small-
to-medium scale monetary policy models used in the literature. One potential source of 
the apparent disconnection between policy practice and policy modeling may be 
identified in the rigid imposition of rational expectations in macroeconometric models 
that ties down all categories of inflation expectations. The policy evaluations generally 
assume a fixed and perfectly known structure of the economy and specify that 
expectations be model-consistent. In such linear fixed-parameter models, once the 
monetary policy rule is specified, inflation expectations can be represented as a linear 
function of economic outcomes. 
These assumptions greatly simplify the analysis but entail significant costs in 
terms of realism. Actually, there are many factors that can give rise to persistent 
deviations between private and central bank forecasts. If agents are less than perfectly 
certain about the structure of the model, its time invariance, or simply the values of the 
model parameters, that is, once imperfect knowledge is acknowledged, the tight 
mechanical link from economic outcomes to the expectation-formation process breaks 
down. 
In this case, forecasts from several sources may well contain valuable information 
for policymakers. The identification of the explicit learning process that economic agents 
employ to form expectations should then be a basic component of a successful monetary 
policy (Sargent, 1993). It is along these lines that the “adaptive learning literature” has 
developed (Orphanides and Williams, 2005; Evans and Honkapohja, 2003a, 2003b). In 
this literature, the assumption of rational expectations with perfect knowledge is relaxed 
and the role of inflation expectations in the economy and in the conduct of monetary 
policy is re-examined. Under rational expectations, inflation expectations equal a linear 
combination of macroeconomic variables and as such provide no additional information 
to the policymaker. By contrast, under learning, private inflation expectations follow a   11
time-varying process and provide useful information for the conduct of monetary policy. 
The precise structure of the economy and the policymakers’ preferences are not perfectly 
known to agents, and expectations are governed by a perpetual learning technology. 
Within this framework, disturbances can give rise to significant and persistent 
endogenous deviations of inflation expectations from those implied by rational 
expectations which are characterized by Goodfriend (1993) (and Orphanides and 
Williams, 2005) as inflation scares. Inflation expectations can then move substantially 
away from the policymaker's target. Through this disconnection, learning models imply 
an important role for learning-induced inflation-expectations dynamics in explaining the 
excess sensitivity of inflation expectations to economic shocks.  
In the present paper, a straightforward way of taking into account forecast 
heterogeneity is suggested. We loosen the tight link between private and central bank 
inflation expectations, arguing that the central bank reacts to the difference between 
expectations from these two sources. On the assumption that the central bank forecasts 
inflation while being aware of the actual model of the economy and of the shocks hitting 
it in real time, and that the private sector forms its inflation expectations on the basis of 
professional forecasts (using only a subset of the information at the disposal of the central 
bank), inflation-forecast heterogeneity is introduced. This heterogeneity, expressed as 
deviation between private and central bank forecasts, is identified as a factor increasing 
inflation persistence and thus calling for a policy reaction. In this respect, the forecast 
deviation is modeled as part of the stochastic process driving the supply shock. We focus 
on the implications that these deviations may have for the conduct of discretionary 
monetary policy. According to the policy rule derived, if private forecasts are inconsistent 
with central bank forecasts, the central bank will react by adjusting its monetary policy 
instrument with a view to reducing the deviation, and thereby speeding up the 
convergence of inflation to its target. 
2.3 Private inflation expectations as a propagation mechanism of supply-side shocks 
The disconnection between central bank and private sector inflation forecasts is 
due to the fact that, contrary to the standard modeling assumptions, the private sector 
does not have full knowledge of the “true macroeconomic model” (as proxied by the   12
central bank’s model) and does not continuously update its own inflation forecasts on the 
basis of new data releases, but uses only a subset of the central bank’s information. The 
private sector appears to form its inflation expectations on the basis of a rule of thumb 
using professional forecasts that incorporate part of the information available to the 
central bank as well as private forecasters’ judgmental adjustments. This behavior is 
described by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) as a near-rational approach to forecasting that 
reduces the costs of gathering and processing information by the private sector. 
Specifically, Carroll (2003) shows that, even though private sector expectations formed 
in this way are not rational in a theoretical sense, expectational dynamics are well-
captured by a model in which private forecasts are based on the published views of 
professional forecasters, which in turn may be closer to rational expectations. Given that 
the diffusion of professional inflation forecasts to the population may be gradual, often 
taking place through probabilistic access of the private sector to new forecast releases, 
private inflation expectations may persistently deviate from central bank forecasts.  
Mankiw and Reis (2001) also provide a justification for the slow adjustment of 
private expectations through a mechanism of price adjustment described as the sticky-
information model, which is also based on the assumption that information is 
disseminated slowly throughout the private sector. This gradual forecast update appears 
to account for at least part of the inflation persistence not accounted for by standard New 
Keynesian Phillips-curve specifications. The larger the deviation between forecasts, the 
larger the informational advantage of the central bank due to its privileged access to some 
data categories (e.g. industrial production, inflation and banking sector data obtained 
through its supervision activities). Moreover, the central bank is able to condition its 
forecasts on the future path of its instrument rate thus having a clear forecasting 
advantage over private forecasters. Evidently, deviations of inflation forecasts tend to 
slow down the dissipation of supply shocks, turning into an autonomous factor in 
monetary policy making. 
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3. A model of optimal policy with heterogenous forecasts  
In this section we present a modification of an optimal forecast-based 
discretionary rule which allows us to analyze the role of inflation-forecast heterogeneity 
in the conduct of monetary policy. We begin by setting up the framework for monetary 
policy analysis. This framework is a standard New Keynesian model similar to that of 
King (2000), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gomes (2005) that constitutes the 
workhorse for modern monetary policy analysis. 
The model consists of a forward-looking IS equation and a New Keynesian 
Phillips curve (derived on the basis of staggered price contracts in a monopolistically 
competitive environment, see Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1980; Calvo, 1983). The relations 
are respectively: 
                                          11 tt t tt tt x ix g ϕπ ++ ⎡⎤ =− − + + ⎣⎦                                            (1)       
                                         1 tt t tt x u π λβ π + =+ +                                                            (2) 
The output gap xt and the inflation rate  t π  in period t are the endogenous variables of the 
system (1)-(2). The output gap is defined as the deviation of output from its potential 
level:  ttt x yy =−, where yt is the actual level of output and  t y  is its potential level 
(both are in logs). The variables  1 tt π + and  1 tt x +  correspond to the expected values of 
inflation and output gap at time t+1 that are conditional on the information set available 
at time t, and it is a short-term nominal interest rate that corresponds to the monetary 
policy instrument. Parameter φ is the interest elasticity of aggregate demand and reflects 
the intertemporal substitution of consumption implying a negative effect of the real 
interest rate on output, λ represents the inflation-output trade-off and β is the discount 
factor reflecting the sensitivity of current inflation to expected inflation (01 β << ). 
Finally, gt and ut are disturbance terms defined as AR(1) processes: 
                                                   1 ˆ tt t g gg μ − = +                                                              (3) 
                                                   1 ˆ tt t uuu ρ − = +                                                               (4)   14
where  0,1 μ ρ ≤≤ . The variables gt and ut correspond to the aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply shocks respectively. The variables  ˆt g  and  ˆt u  are i.i.d. random variables 
with zero mean and variances 
2
g σ and 
2
u σ .   
  A well-known shortcoming of the description of the supply side of the economy 
by a New Keynesian Phillips curve is related to the latter’s inability to reproduce the 
significant degree of inflationary persistence observed in the data (Roberts, 1997,1998). 
Several proposals, often lacking concrete microeconomic foundations, have been made 
for bringing Phillips-curve specifications closer to the data. These suggestions include the 
adaptive inflation-expectations formation put forth by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the near-
rational expectation-formation assumptions by Roberts (1998) and the sticky-information 
approach of Mankiw and Reis (2002). 
  Along the lines of the near-rational approach to inflation modeling, we assume 
that private inflation forecasts are based on an information set that falls short of the 
central bank’s information set and is gradually updated on the basis of professional 
forecasts (Carroll, 2003). More importantly, it is assumed that the private sector is not 
aware in real time of the size and the nature of the inflationary shocks and thus, when it 
becomes aware of the previous-period shock, it initiates a gradual process of adjustment 
that increases inflation persistence. The central bank is also assumed to know this 
sluggish expectation adjustment mechanism used by the private sector. Specifically, we 
make the assumption that there is a forecastable – by the central bank – component of the 
aggregate supply shock (corresponding to the autoregressive term of eq. (4)) that can be 
decomposed into one part that represents the gradual adjustment of private forecasts to 
the central bank forecasts and one that corresponds to the autoregressive behavior of 
structural supply shocks. The deviation between private and central bank forecasts is 
associated with a lengthening of the time horizon over which supply shocks dissipate. 
Thus, equation (4) describing the evolution of the supply shock can be written as : 
                                           11 ˆ tt t t t t udzq d s z u −− =+= + +                                            (5)   15
where  1 t qd −  is the forecastable component of the supply shock that describes the 
persistence of the deviation between private and central bank forecasts, and  1 t sz −  reflects 
the structural supply shock. The parameter q is restricted to be lower than one, ensuring 
the convergence of private and central bank forecasts in the long run. 
  Equations (1) and (2) are the constraints for the central bank in setting monetary 
policy. The central bank’s objective function includes two arguments reflecting its main 
targets of price stability and output stabilization around its potential level. 






tt t j t j
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⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦
⎩⎭ ∑                                         (6) 
Parameter α reflects the relative weight on output gap and is expected to be less than one 
and closer to zero to the extent that price stability emerges as the main target for 
monetary authorities in all modern central banks. The policy problem for the central bank 
is to choose the time path of the instrument it in order to engineer the time paths of the 
target variables xt and πt that minimize the objective function Lt subject to the constraints 
(1) and (2).  
  The optimal rule under discretion can be derived as a solution to a sequence of 
static optimization problems. The Lagrangean function takes  the following form: 
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=
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ =− + + Ξ + − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∑        (7) 
Differentiating with respect to  1 tt π +  and  1 tt x + for any t≥0 gives the following first-order 
conditions: 
                                             () 1 1 0 tt tt βπ + + Ξ+ − Ξ =                                                   (8)    
and                                       1 1 0 t tt x α λ + + + Ξ=                                                              (9) 
Given that Ξt=0 for t=0, we eliminate Ξt+1 from (8) and (9) and get the consolidated first-
order condition:   16




++ + =                                                             (10) 
Combining eq. (10) with the aggregate supply equation (2) we have: 






                                       (11) 
By substituting eq. (10) into (1) and making use of (11), we obtain the expression for the 
optimal interest rate rule  under discretion: 
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or, equivalently, after taking into account the decomposition of the supply shock 































t tt tt d π π −− =−   and   1
P
tt π − denotes the private inflation forecast for period t 
formed at t-1. 
  Equation (13) is the optimal discretionary rule which we are going to estimate in 
the following section. The distinctive feature of this rule is related to the existence of the 
lagged forecast deviation as an additional argument to which monetary policy responds. 
According to this rule, when private forecasts deviate from central bank forecasts, the 
forecast-targeting central bank should react to this by differentiating the interest rate it 
sets. The policy response to the deviation is intuitive: if the private inflation forecast 
exceeds that of the central bank, the latter responds by increasing the policy instrument. 
In this respect, having identified the inflation-forecast deviation as a factor delaying the 
adjustment of private inflation expectations to the target, monetary authorities react more,   17
the larger the size of the deviation during the previous period. This policy reaction speeds 
up the adjustment of inflation toward the targeted path. Specifically, the increase in the 
policy instrument leads to an increase in the real interest rate by a factor greater than one, 
ensuring a contraction in aggregate demand (i.e. a decline in the output gap). This 
contraction acts toward offsetting the inflationary impact due to the autoregressive 
behavior of the supply shock. Thus, the disinflation period is shortened at the cost of 
increased output volatility. The policy behavior implied by this rule, in the case of a 
positive deviation between private and central bank forecasts, appears to be consistent 
with the “shock” approach to disinflation (De Grauwe, 1989) followed inter alia by 
Volcker during the 1980-1984 period. 
  The response coefficient is positively related to the persistence of inflation due to 
the inflation-forecast deviation (reflected in parameter q). On the other hand, the 
responsiveness of monetary policy to the inflation-forecast deviation declines as the 
degree of intertemporal substitution of consumption (φ), the sensitivity of prices to output 
changes (λ, provided that λ>1) and the central bank’s weight on output stabilization (α) 
become larger. The last three parameters determine the cost of disinflation in terms of 
increased output volatility implying that the central bank will be less eager to respond 
strongly to inflation-forecast deviations, the larger the costs are in terms of output 
stabilization and the smaller the persistence of this deviation is. 
  Although it is known that the discretionary rule is time-inconsistent, as the central 
bank will re-optimize in each period having a motive to create an inflationary surprise, it 
is straightforward to modify the rule in order to avoid stabilization bias. Along the lines 
of the optimal delegation literature
1, the anti-inflationary stance of a conservative central 
banker (Rogoff, 1985) could be ensured by the use of an asymmetric policy reaction 
                                                 
1 It is a standard result in the literature on monetary policy  that a better outcome (in terms of inflation and 
output stabilization) can often be obtained  if the central bank is assigned an objective different from the 
true social objective (Woodford, 2002). The problem of choosing an appropriate objective is sometimes 
called the problem of “optimal delegation”. Famous examples include the proposal by Rogoff (1985) that a 
central banker should be chosen who is “conservative”, in the sense of placing a greater weight on inflation 
stabilization than does the social loss function, or the proposal by King (1997) that the central bank should 
aim at stabilizing the output gap around the level consistent with achieving its inflation target on average, 
even when a higher level of output relative to potential would be socially optimal. In both cases, 
modification of the central bank’s objective can eliminate the bias toward higher-than-optimal average   18
function. Such a reaction function entails an increase in the monetary policy instrument 
only in the case of a positive deviation between private and central bank inflation 
forecasts, whereas negative deviations do not lead to a policy reaction.  
  The central bank has in general an imperfect ability to influence inflation 
expectations in the way it would like (Tarkka and Mayes, 1999). There is uncertainty not 
just about the size of the impact of policy and on how fast it works but also about the 
whole model of monetary transmission, the actual policy targets and the time horizon 
over which monetary policy targets should be achieved. This uncertainty is higher in 
periods of serious shocks that may disconnect private expectations from fundamentals. 
Even though the central bank can indicate what it would like to see as an outcome, it 
cannot ensure it. Thus, the monetary policy reaction, in the form of instrument changes, 
to the forecast deviations arises as a prerequisite for speeding up the convergence of 
inflation expectations, and thus, actual inflation toward the policy target in a reasonable 
time horizon.  
 
4. An empirical evaluation of the Fed’s policy rule during the 1974-1998 
period 
The central bank’s policy rule plays a central role in a wide variety of 
macroeconomic analyses, describing inter alia the conduct of monetary policy and its 
links to macroeconomic outcomes. In this section we evaluate the ability of the optimal 
policy rule derived above to describe US monetary policy during the 1974-1998 period. 
4.1 The Fed’s monetary policy rule and macroeconomic outcomes during the past three 
decades 
With respect to economic developments in the US during the past thirty years, it 
is generally agreed that from the late 1960s through the early 1980s the US economy 
displayed high and volatile inflation along with several recessions. Since the early 1980s, 
however, the US has experienced a significant decline in the inflation rate and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
inflation resulting from discretionary policy when the central bank seeks to minimize the true social loss 
function.   19
considerable reduction in output volatility, with the latter becoming increasingly evident 
from the mid-1980s. 
 Many economists cite supply shocks -- and, in particular, oil price shocks -- as 
the main force underlying the instability of the earlier period. It is unlikely, however, that 
supply shocks alone could account for the differences observed between the two periods 
in the absence of an accommodating monetary policy. A related question is to what 
extent the benign inflationary outlook of the 1980s can be attributed to a change in the 
conduct of monetary policy during this period. Several developments, including the 
monetarist influence of the late 1970s, the appointment of a new Chairman of the Fed in 
1979 and specific changes in monetary policy implementation are often cited as factors 
that have fundamentally influenced monetary policy strategy in the US over the past three 
decades (Boivin, 2004). Along these lines, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) suggest the 
accommodating monetary policy stance during the 1970s as the main factor behind the 
upsurge of inflation and Volcker’s appointment as the beginning of an anti-inflationary 
turn in US monetary policy (Boivin, 2004). Boivin (1999) and Cogley and Sargent (2001) 
argue that these changes in the Fed’s strategy, which related inter alia to its evolving 
views about the economy, were gradual.  
Numerous attempts have been made to specify and estimate the Fed’s reaction 
function reflected in the large theoretical and empirical literature in this field. However, 
researchers have not been particularly successful in providing a definitive representation 
of the Fed’s behavior in the form of a single, stable reaction function (Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998). In most cases, there is evidence of significant instability in the 
estimated reaction functions and several explanations have been provided. The most 
common refers to the difficulties in adequately capturing in a simple linear regression the 
complex decision-making process of a central bank. Other explanations are related to 
changes in policy preferences, often reflected in the composition of the Federal Open 
Market Committee as well as to changes in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Nevertheless, the large amount of empirical research on monetary policy rules did 
not lead to a consensus on the nature or even the existence of these hypothesized changes. 
Moreover, other criticisms to the standard approaches to monetary policy modeling using 
policy rules have also been voiced. Such criticisms refer, inter alia, to the inability of the   20
estimated policy rules to take sufficiently into account issues related to the real-time 
observability of the data used for the estimation of the rules and the forward-looking 
aspect of monetary policy conduct. For instance, Orphanides (2002,2003) argues that 
estimating monetary policy rules by using ex post data, which were not available to 
policymakers in real time, may provide a very distorted picture of the conduct of 
monetary policy at that time. He estimates a rule by using real-time data on inflation and 
unemployment and challenges the conventional view according to which the conduct of 
monetary policy during the 1970s is not greatly different from the one thereafter.  
4.2 Specifying and estimating a modified policy rule 
The aim of the empirical part of this paper is to contribute to this debate by 
evaluating the relevance of the rule derived in the previous section which incorporates the 
lagged inflation-forecast deviation as an additional factor considered by the Fed in 
monetary decision-making. This factor, which has not been taken explicitly into account 
in the existing literature appears to explain part of the persistence of the supply shocks 
and, thus, of the underlying inflationary pressures to which policy responded. An 
additional distinctive feature of our specification is that it assumes forward-looking 
behavior which is reflected in the various forecasts. For the estimation of the policy rule, 
forecast data are used as a proxy of the Fed’s as well as of private expectations. These 
forecasts have only been used interchangeably for the estimation of policy rules by 
McNees (1992) and, more recently, by Boivin (2004), Orphanides (2001, 2004) and 
Romer and Romer (2002).  
Hence, our specification responds to criticisms related to the observability of 
forecasts of the target variables, data availability in real time and the inability of the 
standard approaches to take into account the actual information available to 
policymakers. The use of forecasts allows us to incorporate in a single equation 
specification a broader array of timely available information that closely approximates 
the information actually used by the central bank in order to assess the future state of the 
economy. Moreover, our paper casts some light on the weakly substantiated conventional 
view that monetary policy in the United States has gone through a structural change since   21
late 1979, when Paul Volcker took over as a Chairman of the Fed, by identifying the role 
of inflation-forecast deviations in the conduct of monetary policy.  
We estimate the policy rule using real-time quarterly data for the 1974-1998 
period
2. The data is obtained from the FRED and Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Databases. We use as the policy rate the average effective federal funds rate. The central 
bank’s forecasts of inflation -- as measured by the annual rate of change of the GDP 
deflator -- are those used by staff economists of the Board of Governors before each 
FOMC meeting and published in what is known as the Greenbook. The forecasts 
correspond to the average annualized rate of change of the GDP deflator over the next 
four quarters
3. On the assumption that private inflation expectations are formed on the 
basis of published survey measures, private inflation expectations are approximated by 
the mean forecast included in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (reflecting the 
average annualized rate of change of the GDP deflator over the next four quarters). The 
inflation-forecast deviation is calculated as the difference between private and central 
bank forecasts during the same period.  
4.3 A real-time estimate of the output gap 
Data on the expected output gap is calculated on the basis of the output series at 
the disposal of the Fed at each point in time and of the relevant Greenbook forecasts of 
output over the next four quarters. The potential output series is constructed by applying 
sequentially in each quarter a Hodrick-Prescott filter
4 to the historical sequence of real 
output data (including Greenbook forecasts of the level of output in the next four 
quarters). The concept of output used for the calculation of the output gap was the one in 
use at the time, namely GNP before 1992, GDP until 1996 and GDP in chained dollars 
since 1996 until the end of the sample. Hence, the series constructed incorporates 
                                                 
2 The period corresponds to the Chairmanships of Arthur Burns and George Miller (1974 Q1 through 1978 
Q1 and 1978 Q2 through 1979 Q2 respectively, given that 1974 Q1 is the earliest date for which data on 
private inflation forecasts is available from the Survey of Professional Forecasters), Paul Volcker’s (1979 
Q3 through 1987 Q2) and Alan Greenspan’s (1987 Q3 through 1998 Q2, when the latest Greenbook data 
release is available). 
3 We used GDP deflator forecasts since data on CPI inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters is available from 1980 onwards.   22
information that was actually available to the Fed and could therefore influence policy 
decisions. 
The use of forecasts as measures of the relevant policy target variables has two 
important advantages worth noting from the outset. First, as emphasized by Orphanides 
(2001, 2002), these forecasts are based on the information that was actually available 
whenever policy decisions were made, reflecting the real-time perception by the central 
bank and the private sector of the state of the economy. Second, in the presence of 
parameter instability, the use of these forecasts makes the analysis robust to the Lucas 
(1976) critique. In this respect, Romer and Romer (2000) and Bernanke and Boivin 
(2003), argue that the conditioning of these forecasts on a large set of timely available 
information justifies estimating the policy rule as a single equation avoiding explicitly 
modeling and estimating the actual expectation-formation process. The latter approach 
has been followed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), who assume that the Fed has 
rational expectations, which implies a set of moment conditions that can be used in a 
GMM framework (Boivin, 1999).  
4.4 Estimates of the reaction function  
In this section we present estimates of the policy reaction function derived in 
Section 3 and evaluate its ability to describe US monetary policy making during the 
1974-1998 period. We achieve two main objectives. First, we demonstrate the existence 
of a systematic relationship between the federal funds rate and inflation-forecast 
deviations as well as forecasts of future inflation and output gap along the lines suggested 
by our model. Second, we identify the role of forecast deviations in the conduct of 
monetary policy and perform a counterfactual experiment deriving the policy rate path 
implied by the application of a modified version of the original policy rule that admits an 
instrument movement only when private inflation forecasts are higher than central bank 
forecasts.  
                                                                                                                                                 
4 To guard against the possibility that potential output may have undergone trend shifts, we use an 
algorithm such as the H-P filter that assigns more weight on recent data in constructing the end-of-sample 
estimate. The result is a flexible trend that can adapt to shifts in true potential output (Lansing, 2002).   23
  The empirical version of the policy rule represented by equation (13) is the 
following: 
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t π  and 
ep
t π denote the central bank’s and private forecasts respectively, in period 
t, of the average annual rate of change of the GDP deflator over the next four quarters, 
e
tj t x +  represents the respective central bank forecast of the output gap and  t FD  is the 
deviation between the private sector’s ()
ep
t π  and the central bank’s()
e
t π inflation 
forecasts. Finally, c is by construction the equilibrium nominal interest rate and wt stands 
for an autoregressive error term reflecting the combined influence of demand and supply 
shocks. 
Instrumental variables are used for the estimation of the policy rule, as this rule 
includes current-period measures of expectations and is estimated on a relatively small 
sample. These measures of expectations, reflected in the central bank’s and private 
forecasts, are probably characterized by measurement errors that make them noisy 
indicators of the actual economy-wide expectations. Moreover, these measurement errors 
are likely to be serially correlated thus calling for the use of an instrumental variables 
estimator (Roberts, 1998). 
  The instrument set includes lagged changes of the federal funds rate, the price 
level, the M2 monetary aggregate as well as the spread between the 10-year bond rate and 
the three-month Treasury bill rate, and lagged values of the real-time output gap. The 
lagged inflation-forecast deviation is not used as an instrument due to the possibility of 
serially correlated measurement errors in these forecasts. The equation is estimated with 
GMM allowing for up to sixth-order serial correlation, with the Newey-West adjustment 
to the weighting matrix.  
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  The parameter estimates of the policy rule, their standard errors, and the J-test for 
instrument exogeneity are given in Table 1. Our main hypothesis that the inflation-
forecast deviation helps account for changes in monetary policy appears to be confirmed 
by the empirical results. An important finding is the statistical significance of the 
coefficient μ on the inflation-forecast deviation suggesting that the latter constituted a 
distinct source of information to monetary policymakers leading to policy adjustments 
beyond those justified by developments in the forecasts of the main target variables.  
  Dummy-type stability tests as well as split-sample estimates do not provide any 
indication for the occurrence of a break in the late 1970s, as is usually claimed in the 
literature
5. The stability of the estimated policy rule over the whole sample period 
indicates that our specification accounts satisfactorily for the most important factors 
feeding into the Fed’s policy decisions. The coefficient θ, reflecting the instrument 
response to changes in expected inflation exceeds one, being fairly close to the Taylor’s 
benchmark of 1.5 and is somewhat lower compared to the estimated value of 2 in the 
forward-looking specification of Clarida et al. (2000). The coefficient on the expected 
output gap (0.18) is at the lower bound of the respective estimates derived from forward-
looking rules reported in the literature (ranging from 0.25 to 1.2). Finally, the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the forecast-deviation term (0.97) reflects the empirical 
relevance of forecast heterogeneity as a key consideration in US monetary policy actions 
during the sample period. More specifically it appears that a deviation of one percentage 
point between private sector and central bank inflation forecasts implies an average 
adjustment of the federal funds rate by about the same magnitude.  
  To assess the contribution of our preferred rule specification to our understanding 
of US policy making, we also present estimates of three alternative specifications which 
include only the expected or contemporaneous values of inflation and the output gap. 
Thus, we estimate i) the forecast-based policy rule of eq.(16) by omitting the inflation-
forecast deviation term, ii) a forward-looking rule in which final data are substituted for 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, as it is widely believed that US monetary policy took an important anti-inflationary turn 
with the appointment of Volcker that marked the beginning of an apparently successful and long-lasting 
(though costly in terms of output stabilization) disinflation, we also estimated separate rules corresponding 
to the three different Fed Chairmanships. The results are broadly similar to those obtained for the full   25
real-time forecasts and iii) a simple Taylor rule that contains as arguments only the 
current-period realization of inflation and output gap. Both the measures of expectations 
and output gap that are used in the alternative forward-looking specifications are, by 
construction, directly comparable with the respective variables included in the original 
specification.  
  As can be seen from the estimates presented in Table 1, the forecast-based rule 
without the inflation-forecast deviation term provides a qualitatively similar picture of the 
Fed’s behavior although, as suggested by the relevant literature (see among others 
Orphanides, 2003), it is characterized by a high degree of instability across different 
regimes of US monetary policy. As regards the rule estimated on final data, the 
coefficient on expected inflation is slightly greater than one whereas the coefficient on 
output gap is significantly higher than that of the real-time forecast-based specification 
(0.66 against 0.20) mainly reflecting the high output gap coefficient in the Burns period. 
Similar results are obtained from the simple Taylor rule, although in this rule we get more 
indications of a structural break in the late-1970s.  
  The policy reaction to the inflation-forecast deviation together with the change in 
the sign of this deviation emerge as the main factors behind the significant Fed policy 
reversal of the late 1970s. As shown in Fig. 1, the private sector had consistently 
underestimated inflationary pressures during the 1970s, with the average deviation being 
of the order of 0.3 per cent and peaking at 1.3 per cent in 1979. The Fed appears to have 
taken advantage of the room for maneuver provided by lower private inflation 
expectations by setting the federal funds rate target at a lower level than the one implied 
by its internal forecasts of the main policy target variables. Fig 2. presents our estimate of 
the policy instrument path derived from a modified version of the policy rule represented 
by eq. (16) in which we restrict the policy reaction to take place only in the case of a 
positive inflation-forecast deviation (i.e. when the private forecast was higher that the 
central bank forecast). Evidently, the federal funds rate implied by the modified rule 
appears to be about 4 percentage points higher than its actual level, indicating the 
importance of the reaction to the negative forecast deviation in explaining the 
                                                                                                                                                 
sample with the exception of the Burns period where the relatively small sample is likely to have induced   26
accommodating monetary policy stance during the 1970s. The lower coefficient on the 
real-time output gap forecast relative to the coefficient obtained from specifications 
including measures of the contemporaneous output gap appears to reflect the gradualism 
characterizing monetary policy decisions based on expectations of target variables which 
are surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty.  
4.5 Interest-rate smoothing 
Central banks often appear to adjust interest rates in a gradual fashion, taking 
small, distinct steps toward a desired instrument setting and reverse course only at 
infrequent intervals (Rudebusch, 2002). Several arguments have been put forward in the 
literature to explain the gradual response of the Fed’s policymakers to changes in 
inﬂation and the output gap, including the existence of forward-looking strategies and 
uncertainties about economic data that are subject to revision, the structural model of the 
economy and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Accordingly, we allow for 
the possibility that the federal funds rate adjusts gradually to achieve the level suggested 
by the optimal rule. Thus, the rule takes the following form:  
                   () ( ) 11 . ............... 1( 1 7 . )
ee
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As is evident from Table 2, the coefficient on the interest-rate smoothing term is 
considerably lower (0.26) compared to that estimated from standard Federal Reserve’s 
policy rule specifications which typically ﬁnd a coefficient on lagged federal funds rate 
of the order of 0.80. This coefficient is also significantly lower than those obtained from 
our specification estimated on final data (0.74) and from the simple Taylor rule (0.60). 
Hence, according to our preferred specification, the Fed makes 75 per cent of the 
necessary adjustment (implied by developments in expected inflation and the output gap) 
in one quarter instead of about 4 to 5 quarters reported by most studies. The persistence 
in the inflation forecast deviation to which the Fed responds rather than policy inertia 
appears to be the main mechanism that often leads to the observed repetitive policy 
instrument movements in the same direction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
upward bias in the coefficient estimates.   27
Nevertheless, our results appear to accord well with a number of studies using 
real-time data for the estimation of the policy rules (Lansing, 2002; Rudebusch, 2002). 
These studies show that attempts to identify the Fed’s rule using ﬁnal data (as opposed to 
real-time data) can create the spurious result of an extremely high degree of interest-rate 
inertia when, in fact, interest-rate smoothing by the central bank is only modest
6. Lansing 
(2002) shows that the lagged federal funds rate can enter spuriously with a very high 
coefficient in ﬁnal-data policy rule regressions because it helps pick up the Fed’s serially 
correlated real-time measurement errors which are not taken into account in standard rule 
specifications. He ﬁnds that this misspeciﬁcation problem can explain as much as half of 
the apparent degree of “inertia’’ or “partial adjustment’’ in the US federal funds rate. 
Rudebusch (2002) notes that while the concept of interest-rate smoothing applies to the 
federal funds rate movements over the course of several weeks or months, it does not 
necessarily imply a large regression coefficient on the lagged federal funds rate at the 
quarterly frequency. He also presents evidence from the term structure of US interest 
rates to reject the hypothesis of a large degree of monetary policy inertia. Under the 
assumption that longer-term interest rates are governed by agents’ rational expectations 
of future short-term rates, Rudebusch argues that “quarterly interest-rate smoothing is a 
very modest phenomenon in practice and thus, the interest-rate-smoothing term should 
not exceed 0.4”. In this respect, the inclusion in our optimal rule of the inflation-forecast 
deviation term and the use of a real-time output gap forecast appear to improve the 
empirical relevance of the rule by taking into account the persistent nature of forecast 
errors, and thus reducing monetary policy inertia.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper questioned the common practice in monetary policy modeling of 
ignoring the role of inflation-forecast heterogeneity in forward-looking policy making. 
We investigated the existence of a link between observed inflation persistence and the 
                                                 
6 Nevertheless, other studies, such as Orphanides (2001) and Perez (2001), continue to find a large and 
statistically significant coefficient on the lagged federal funds rate even when policy rules are estimated by 
using real-time data.   28
deviation between central bank and private inflation forecasts that motivates policy 
reactions additional to those related to developments in the main policy target variables. 
The deviation between the Fed’s and private inflation forecasts was considered as 
a basic determinant of inflation persistence leading to a slowdown in the pace at which 
supply shocks fade away. In this vein, the autoregressive error term of the Phillips curve 
corresponding to supply shocks was decomposed into a part related to the persistence of 
the forecast deviation and a remaining part reflecting structural supply factors. An 
optimal policy rule was obtained by the minimization under discretion of a standard 
central bank loss function subject to the constraints provided by the modified Phillips 
curve, including the forecast deviation, and a standard forward-looking aggregate demand 
equation. The rule includes the forecast deviation as an additional argument. This 
deviation leads to monetary policy adjustments above and beyond those justified by 
changes in the forecasts of the target variables. The rule was estimated on US data 
covering the period 1974-1998 on the basis of real-time inflation and output gap forecasts 
obtained by using the FOMC’s Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
The monetary policy reaction to the forecast deviation appears to have been an 
important factor underlying the successful disinflation of the 1980s as well as the 
persistence of inflationary pressures during the 1970s. In particular, the FOMC appears to 
have tightened whenever the private inflation forecast was higher than the Fed’s forecast, 
and to have eased when it was lower.  
The estimated rule remains remarkably stable over the whole sample period, a 
situation that appears to be at odds with the conventional wisdom. Notably, the 
coefficient on expected inflation is greater than one, exceeding by a wide margin the 
response coefficient obtained from the forward-looking rule estimated on final data or 
from the simple Taylor rule. The coefficient on the expected output gap is lower than the 
corresponding coefficient we get from rules estimated on final data, reflecting the 
gradualism that characterizes monetary policy decisions based on expectations of target 
variables which are surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. 
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Overall, our paper challenges the widely held view that monetary policy in the US has 
gone through a structural change since late 1979, when Paul Volcker took over as a 
Chairman of the Fed, by identifying the role of inflation-forecast deviations in the 
conduct of monetary policy. The novel explanation put forward for the pre-1980 high-
inflation period is that it cannot be attributed to activist policies aiming at output gap 
stabilization, as is usually argued, but to the insufficient monetary policy tightening in a 
period in which private inflation forecasts were lower than the respective central bank 
forecasts. Similarly, the success of Volcker’s disinflation is attributed inter alia to the 
forceful Fed reaction to this deviation in a period when private expectations exceeded 
central bank forecasts. Finally, the small coefficient on the lagged interest rate variable in 
the estimated rule appears to lend support to the growing view that interest rate inertia 
may, to a large extent, be an artifact of serially correlated forecast errors which are not 
taken into account by conventional rule specifications but feed into monetary policy 
decisions in real time.   30
Appendix. Data sources 
  All data series are quarterly, beginning in 1974:1 and ending in 1998:2. Data on 
the federal funds rate, the GDP deflator, the M2 monetary aggregate and the spread 
between the 10-year bond yield and the three-month Treasury bill rate are all from the 
Federal Reserve System’s Database (FRED). Data on GDP deflator forecasts were taken 
from the FOMC’s Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters datasets 
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 Table 1 
Alternative specifications of the Fed’s reaction function: Specifications without interest-rate smoothing 
 
e
t π  
e
t x  
FDt-1 Const.  2 R   Q J-test 
Forecast-based 
rule with real-































































Alternative specifications of the Fed’s reaction function: Specifications with interest-rate smoothing 
 
Notes for Tables 1 and 2: 
e
t π  denotes the central bank forecast in period t of the average annual rate of change of the GDP deflator 
over the next four quarters and 
e
t x  stands for central bank output gap forecast. In the cases of the forward-looking rule and  the simple 
Taylor  rule (lines 3 - 4 in Tables 1 and 2), 
e
t π  and 
e
t x correspond to the actual data on the rate of change of the GDP deflator and the 
output gap in the next four quarters and in the current quarter respectively. FDt stands for the deviation between the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and the Greenbook forecasts of the rate of change of the GDP deflator over the next four quarters, Const. 
denotes constant and it-1 stands for the interest-rate smoothing term. J-test reports the p-values for the relevant test statistic under the 
null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. 
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